How to generate semantically meaningful and structurally sound adversarial examples?
Introduction
Recent developments in adversarial machine learning [1, 2, 3] have cast serious concerns on the robustness of deep learning models. Although many defense mechanisms [4, 5, 6, 7] have been proposed to alleviate the security risks faced by these models, very few stand resilient to attacks [1, 8] . This suggests the need to probe the models even more to discover their vulnerabilities. Adversarial attacks aim in general at manipulating images or text data with tiny targeted nuisances so as to deceive a classifier into making incorrect predictions. For images, the adversarial examples are generated to be identical to the inputs albeit the precise locations of some details in the true images might still not be preserved. We reckon that exact locations of fine details are not necessarily relevant for perceptual recognition. For text, however, this is not always the case. Indeed, slight perturbations to text can alter its readability and corrupt its meaning. Being able to generate coherent and informative adversarial text implies the need for the adversaries to be grammatically and linguistically sound. That is, the text adversaries need to retain the structure and convey ideally the meaning of the original inputs. We posit that the reason existing approaches fail to enforce such requirements both for images and text is because the adversaries they create do not necessarily lie within the manifold of the true cases. This could be attributed to the difficulty to characterize such manifold and to perturbing the inputs along suboptimal gradient directions [9, 10, 11] .
In this study, we explore a novel approach based on the manifold invariance property, which we formalize below, to generate coherent, diverse, and meaningful adversaries in the image and text domains. We especially require the adversaries to reflect the structure and semantics of the true inputs; that is their distributions should match. To intuitively introduce our framework, we first decompose the noise-based adversarial learning problem into: (1) manifold learning where we develop a novel variational inference technique to project high-dimensional data into a low dense representation that faithfully characterizes its distribution, and (2) manifold perturbation under the manifold invariance constraint where we describe a simple yet efficient perturbation strategy that ensures cases we perturb remain in the manifold of the true examples. We subsequently illustrate how the rich latent structure exposed in the manifold can be leveraged as a source of knowledge upon which adversarial constraints can be imposed concomitantly with learning the manifold. We apply our approach to both images and text data in a black-box setting to generate adversaries that are structurally and semantically sound, and perceptually similar to the real inputs. Before we proceed, we formalize the invariance concept. Definition 1.1. Manifold Invariance. Let (X , d) be a metric space and h : X → X a homeomorphism. Given u ∈ X , a neighborhood U of u is invariant or stable under h if:
Definition 1.1 stipulates that u and any point v ∈ U remain close, in distance, as the number of mappings n increase. To see how Definition 1.1 can be enforced in an adversarial setting, notice first that all the points v ∈ U are similar to u up to a constant by the limit convergence 2 . Thus, we only need find one point v that fools a classifier. However, characterizing the topology of U is challenging, much more so in the latent Z space we operate. Hence, we consider two transformations h 1 : X → Z and h 2 : X → Z parameterized respectively by ω 1 and ω 2 and use h 2 to find points that lie in the neighborhood U of h 1 (u) in Z. We map them back to X and select the sample that induces adversariality. We define our adversarial learning objective as: Definition 1.2. Adversarial Learning. Let (X , d), (Z, d) be metric spaces, g a black-box classifier, and φ : Z → X a mapping function.
The main contributions of our work are thus: we propose (1) a stochastic variational inference method for manifold learning in the presence of continuous latent variables with intractable and implicit posterior distributions, (2) an intuitive manifold perturbation strategy that guarantees perturbed elements of a manifold remain within it, (3) a natural way to generate adversarial examples by ensuring they follow probability distributions similar to the inputs, and (4) illustration on images and text, as well as the empirical validation.
Problem Setup & Architecture
Consider D a dataset of training examples, Y their corresponding classes, and g a black-box classifier. We want to generate adversarial examples of the true cases. Essentially, for x ∈ D and its class y, we want its adversary x to come from a distribution similar to P x of x. In particular, we require x to be the nearest such instance to x in the manifold that defines the data distribution P x and subject to adversariality. By "nearest", we mean the instance x must portray similar high-level structure and semantic features as x. Therefore, we ask ourselves the following questions:
1. How to learn the manifold M that best characterizes the structure and semantics of D? 2. How to perturb the elements of M such that the perturbed elements also stay in M? 3. How to guide the perturbation process to generate coherent and informative adversaries?
To address these questions, and setting Definition 1.2 as our guiding principle, we propose as framework the architecture depicted in Figure 1 . Our framework is essentially a variational autoencoder with two encoders that model the distributions of the random variables ω 1 and ω 2 . The encoders are designed to faithfully learn the true underlying distribution of D instead of its relaxed approximation [12] . This is achieved by using two subtle inference mechanisms that optimize both for uncertainty and guarantee easy sampling at inference time. The decoder p φ on the other hand acts as a generative model for crafting adversaries, and a proxy for creating latent targets in the z-space in order to optimize the first encoder; a process we refer to as inversion and illustrate in Figure 2 . We discuss both features in detail in section 4.1.
Unlike most perturbation-based approaches [13, 14] that search for adversaries in the input space of D, we leverage the dense representation of the z-space of D; the intuition being that the z-space captures well the structure and semantics of D. Thus, rather than finding the adversary of a given x in D, we learn to perturb its latent code z in a way that the perturbed version z and z lie in the same manifold space defined by the distribution P x . Then, using our decoder p φ , we construct x . By learning to efficiently perturb the manifold of D, and then mapping elements of this low-dimensional space back to the input space, we control simultaneously the perturbations we inject to the adversarial cases thereby ensuring the adversaries are similar to the inputs in structure and semantics. 
Technical Background
Manifold Learning -To uncover structure in some high dimensional data D and understand its metaproperties, it is common practice to project D down to a low dimensional subspace where explanatory hidden features may become apparent. Manifold learning is based on the assumption that the data of interest lies on or near lower dimensional manifolds in its embedding space. In the variational autoencoder (VAE) [12] setting, the datapoints x n ∈ D are modeled via a decoder x n |z n ∼ p φ (x n |z n ) with a prior p(z) placed on the latent codes z n . To learn the parameters φ, one typically maximizes a variational approximation to the empirical expected log-likelihood, 1/N N n=1 log p φ (x n ), called evidence lower bound (ELBO) and defined by:
To evaluate the objective L e , we require the ability to sample efficiently from q(z|x; ψ), the encoder distribution which approximates the posterior inference p(z|x; φ). Specifically, we need a closed and differentiable form for q ψ in order to evaluate the expectation. The reparameterization trick [12] provides a simple way to rewrite the expectation E z|x;ψ such that the Monte Carlo estimate of L e is differentiable w.r.t ψ. More formally, under some mild differentiability conditions, the random variable z ∼ q ψ (z|x) can be reparameterized using a differentiable transformation g ψ ( , x) of an auxiliary noise variable :
where the prior p( ) is generally confined to a family of simple and tractable distributions like a Gaussian distribution.
Stein Variational Gradient Descent (SVGD) [15] is a nonparametric variational inference method that combines the advantages of MCMC sampling and variational inference. Unlike variational bayes in VAEs [12] , SVGD does not confine the target distributions it approximates to simple or tractable parametric distributions while still remaining efficient. To approximate a distribution, SVGD maintains M particles Θ = {θ m } M m=1 , initially sampled from a simple distribution, it iteratively transports via functional gradient descent. Henceforward, we shall consider these particles as instances of model parameters. At iteration t, each particle θ ∈ Θ is updated using the following rule:
where t is a step-size and k(., .) is a positive-definite kernel. In eq. (2), each particle determines its update direction by consulting with other particles and asking their gradients. The importance of the latter particles is weighted according to the distance measure k(., .). Closer particles are given higher consideration than those lying further away. The term ∇ θ j k(θ j , θ m ) is a regularizer that acts as a repulsive force between the particles to prevent them from collapsing into one particle. The resulting particles can thus be used to approximate the predictive posterior distribution over the dataset D:
Proposed Method
In this section, we first describe a novel stochastic variational inference method to learn the manifold of D that we denote M. We want M to best elicit the structure and semantics of D with minimal assumptions about the probability distribution of D. Then, by learning parameterized transformations M is invariant to, we learn to perturb M, and simultaneously to generate adversarial examples.
Implicit Manifold Learning
Manifold learning is based on the assumption that the data one attempts to learn lies on or near lower dimensional manifolds in its embedding space. There exist many manifold learning techniques. Of practical interest to us are the VAEs.
As described in section 3, it is customary to optimize the ELBO in eq. (1) when modeling VAEs due to the intractability of the likelihood objective. Moreover, we need a closed and differentiable form for the encoder q ψ . This is achieved by reparameterizing the encoder q ψ using a differentiable transformation conditioned on some Gaussian noise. The issue with using a Gaussian prior as distribution for the auxiliary noise is that it leads to uninformative latent codes [16] ; which can consequently lead to learning a manifold that characterizes poorly the structure of the data.
Thus, rather than optimizing the ELBO explicitly, Pu et al. [17] minimize the divergence D KL (q(z|x; ψ) p(z|x; φ)). For an instance x ∈ D, they draw M latent codes by means of a recognition network and update them via SVGD. Here, we focus on the D KL term as well. Similar to [17] , we make use of a recognition network to sample model instances that generate these codes during training and inference. In contrast to [17] , we generate the latent codes using the sampled model instances or particles and not from directly applying dropout noise on the recognition network.
To start, let Θ = {θ m } M m=1 be a set of particles. We aim to leverage these particles to project D in some latent space Z. This projection inherently induces uncertainty we ought to capture in order to learn the manifold of D efficiently. Bayesian methods provide a principled way to model uncertainty through the posterior distribution over model parameters. Thus, we let every particle θ m define the weights and biases of a Bayesian neural network. For large M , generating the particles can be computationally prohibitive because of the memory footprint. Furthermore, the need to generate them during inference for each test example is undesirable. To remedy this, we train a recognition network f (.; η) parameterized by η that takes as input some noise ξ m ∼ N (0, I) and outputs θ m = f (ξ m ; η). The parameters η are explicitly updated through a small number of gradient steps in order to produce good generalization performance for the particles. If we denote by η j the parameters of f at iteration j, we get η j+1 by proceeding as follows:
with τ is defined in eq. (2). In the following, we shall use SVGD τ (Θ) to denote one application of this update to Θ. Figure 2 : Inversion. During one inner gradient update, we sample some noise ξ that we feed to f η to generate one particle θ. Given an input example x, we obtain z ∼ p(z|x, θ) that we reconstruct tõ x. Then, usingx we sample againz ∼ p(z|x, θ). Now,z becomes the target of z. During the next update,z becomes the prediction, and we repeat this process again to generate a target forz.
To apply SVGD τ , we need to evaluate τ which depends on the posterior p(z|x, D) in eq. (3). Computing this posterior requires having a target z for x. To this end, we use our decoder p φ to create a target for x by first mapping x to a latent code z, then samplingx ∼ p(x|z, φ), and subsequently re-mapping this reconstruction back in the z-space. We summarize this procedure in Figure 2 .
As in [17] , f η plays a role analogous to q ψ in eq. (1). It gives us means to sample latent codes from a particle θ m given an input x without imposing an explicit and functional parametric form for q ψ . Unlike [17] , we do not apply SVGD on the latent codes but on the particles that generate the codes. By also being Bayesian, every particle θ m provides some prior information p(θ m ) on how to sample these codes. During training and inference, we use Bayesian model averaging to get a latent code z from x; formally, if x ∈ D, for instance, then z ∼ p(z|x; D) where the posterior p is given by:
p(z|x, θm).
Learning to Perturb a Manifold
Previously, we described a method to project D in its embedding space to learn its manifold M. In this section, we focus on learning to perturb the points of M. We especially require the perturbed points to reside in M so that they too exhibit the features of M. Intuitively, we aim to learn a set of transformations 3 Θ that M is invariant to or that preserve M. Formally, if we let θ be one such transformation, for instance, θ must satisfy:
Gram-Schmidt Gradient Sign Method (GGSM) is a new perturbation method we introducesimilar in spirit to fast-gradient sign method of [11] -to perturb the manifold M. With GGSM, we want to render M invariant to the perturbations induced by the transformations Θ . In algebraic terms, if Z is a subspace of M, and U an orthonormal basis of Z, we perturb Z by finding a subspace spanned by U in the form of:
the goal being to get the values λ i be as small as possible.
To start, let us define Θ = {θ m } M m=1 where every θ m defines the weights and biases of a Bayesian neural network. Let B x be a minibatch of training samples of D, and B m z be their latent codes where for every z im ∈ B m z , z im ∼ p(z|x i , θ m ) with x i ∈ B x . We aim to learn each θ m ∈ Θ in a way to generate perturbed versions of B m z along the directions of an orthonormal basis U m . Given that a manifold is locally Euclidean, we measure the dimension of a local neighborhood of B m z by applying Gram-Schmidt to orthogonalize the span of representative local points. We formalize this objective as an optimization problem where we jointly learn the perturbations λ m and the directions sign(U m ) along which we should perturb B m z . More specifically, we consider the following update rules:
To further describe the update rules in eq. (5), we first sample a model instance θ m from f (ξ m ; η ), then we generate M latent codes z im ∼ p(z |x i , θ m ) with x i ∈ B x . We compute an orthonormal basis U m for B m z and optimize for the noise tensor λ m that minimizes the objective τ along the directions of the basis vectors u m i ∈ U m . With λ m fixed, we minimize τ again to get θ m . For large M , maintaining Θ can however be computationally prohibitive. Thus, as in section 4.1, we make use of a recognition network f η that takes as input some noise ξ m ∼ N (0, I) and generates θ m = f (ξ m ; η ). As before, η is here too updated through a small number of gradient steps; that is at iteration j + 1, we get η j+1 by:
In the following, we use the notation GGSM(Θ , λ) where λ = [λ 1 , ..., λ M ] to update Θ at once.
Distribution Matching -Although GGSM confers us clear benefits in the forms of latent noise imperceptibility and sampling speed, it cannot prevent the model instances Θ from deviating from the particles Θ. This understandably contradicts the requirement in Definition 1.2 that the discrepancy D f (ω 1 ω 2 ) between the distributions of ω 1 and ω 2 , modeled by Θ and Θ , needs to be small; the intuition being to render the dissimilarity between adversarial samples we generate afterwards and real inputs as imperceptible as possible. To remedy this, we further regularize the θ m ∈ Θ after every GGSM update. In essence, we apply one SVGD update on the θ m 's. Unlike in eq. (2), the parameters Θ determine here their own update direction by consulting the particles Θ alone instead of consulting each other. We slightly modify the objective τ in eq. (2) to ensure the model instances θ ∈ Θ follow the transform maps constructed by the θ ∈ Θ [18] :
In the following, we use SVGDτ to denote the gradient update rule in eq. (7) using the operatorτ .
Jointly Learning to Project and Attack
To introduce our approach, we decomposed the adversarial learning problem into two tasks: 1) manifold learning where we introduced a new method to project high-dimensional data into a low dense representation to faithfully characterizes its distribution, and 2) manifold perturbation where we ensure cases we perturb remain in the manifold of the true examples. Here, we show how both tasks can be unified in one learning procedure to generate adversarial examples.
In general, there are two ways to produce adversarial examples: via white-box [11] or black-box [19] attack. In the more standard black-box case, which is the main focus of this study, we only have access to the predictions of a classifier g and need to produce adversaries not knowing the intricacies of g nor having access to its loss function. In this setting, adversarial examples are produced by maximizing an auxiliary loss, here the log-likelihood P (y |x ), of a target class y ∈ Y \ {y} over an -radius ball around the input x [14] . This is formalized as:
Thus, given g, we illustrate this end-to-end procedure in algorithm 1. First, we sample Θ, the particles that learn to model the distribution of D in its manifold M, from f η . Then, we sample Θ , a set of transformations from f η we want M to be invariant to under the perturbations these transformations induce. Both Θ and Θ act as encoders of D but Θ more faithfully than Θ . Both also attempt to capture the complex uncertainty structure of D by learning to approximate its predictive posterior in eq. (3). To optimize Θ, we have to compute this posterior. We do so after the first inner gradient update by using the inversion mechanism we described in Figure 2 in an iterative fashion. From updating Θ, we optimize f η using stochastic gradient descent. Then, we apply τ in eq. (7) to optimize Θ , and subsequently update η . This summarizes the inner-training of the recognition networks f η and f η . To generate adversarial examples, we extend the objective in eq. (8) as follows:
where L rec is the reconstruction error of x that we formalize in section 5; the second term is the cost incurred for failing to fool the classifier g. Notice that we did not require in Definition 1.2 that g(u) − g(h n 2 (u)) ≤ -in this context the constraint x − x p ≤ attack -to hold. However, for the purpose of targeting the certified defenses [5] and [7] , we enforce it during training.
Experiments & Results
We evaluate our approach on a number of black-box classification tasks of images and text.
Image Datasets -For image classification, we experiment with three standard datasets: MNIST [20] , CelebA [21] and SVHN [22] . For MNIST and SVHN, each image of a digit represents the class the image belongs to. For CelebA, we group the face images according to their gender (female, male), and focus on gender classification similar to [2] .
Text Datasets -For text classification, we consider the SNLI [23] dataset. SNLI consists of sentence pairs where each pair contains a premise and a hypothesis, and a label indicating the relationship (entailment, neutral, contradiction) between the premise and hypothesis. For instance, the following pair is assigned the label entailment to indicate that the premise entails the hypothesis.
Premise: A soccer game with multiple males playing. Hypothesis: Some men are playing a sport.
Model Settings -We embed the image and text inputs using a convolutional neural network (CNN). To generate adversarial images, we design the decoder p φ as a transpose CNN. For adversarial text generation, we consider the following designs for p φ : 1) a transpose CNN, 2) a language model, and 3) using a pre-trained ARAE [26] model. The recognition networks f η and f η are fully connected neural networks of similar architecture. To evaluate our approach, we target a range of adversarial models. For more details on the architectures of these models, the CNN embedder, f η , f η , and the decoder p φ , we refer the reader to appendix A.
Generating Image Adversaries
Setup -As argued in [1] , the strongest non-certified defense to date against adversarial attacks is adversarial training with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [6] . We evaluate the strength of our MNIST, CelebA and SVHN adversaries against adversarially trained ResNet [24] models with a Hypothesis: Two people play in the snow. Label: Contradiction 40-step PGD and noise margin attack less than 0.3. The ResNet models follow the architecture design of [2] . For MNIST, we also target two pre-trained certified defenses [5] and [7] with attack set to 0.1.
We formalize L rec in eq. (9) respectively as two p−norm losses and a discriminative loss. For the p-norm case, we first reconstruct using the true inputs as targets, i.e., L rec = x − x p where x ∈ D and x are samples we generate. For the latter, we use a pre-trained Wasserstein formulation of AC-GAN [25] to generate samplesx and set L rec = x − x p . Finally, we use the discriminator of the same GAN to discriminate between x and x . We experiment with all these L rec variants and report only the results where both the adversarial success rates and sample quality are high.
Adversarial Success Rate (ASR) -In Table 1 , we report our best results both for the certified and non-certified target models. Against the non-certified defenses, we achieve an ASR of 97.2% for MNIST, 87.6% for SVHN, and 84.4% for CelebA. The certified defenses on MNIST guarantee that no attack with attack ≤ 0.1 can have a success rate larger than 35% and 5.8% respectively. However, our ASR against these defenses is 95.2% and 96.8%. For all the datasets, the latent noise levels are smaller than attack , and the accuracies of the target models are higher than 96.3%; thus proving the effectiveness of our method in generating strong adversaries.
Noise Level -We compute the latent strength of the adversaries by evaluating the average spectral norm of the learned perturbations over few minibatch samples. As can be noted in Table 1 , the latent nuisances are smaller than attack , and significantly lower than in [2] 4 . Beyond the imperceptibility of our adversaries, these noise levels show that the distributions the particles Θ and the model instances Θ follow are similar. This is further illustrated in Figure 4 by the overlapping marginal distributions of Θ and Θ ; thus resulting in good sample quality as exemplified in Figure 3 .
Generating Text Adversaries
Setup -We perturb the hypotheses sentences to attack our SNLI classifier with the premise sentences kept unchanged. Similar to [3] , we use ARAE [26] for word embedding, and a CNN for sentence embedding. To generate adversarial sentences from the perturbed latent codes, we experiment with three decoders: 1) p φ is a transpose CNN, 2) p φ is a language model, and 3) we use the decoder of a pre-trained ARAE [26] model. In all three cases, we use as reconstruction loss L rec in eq. cross-entropy loss. We detail the configuration design of each decoder in appendix A. We generate our text adversaries at word level using a vocabulary of 11,000 words only.
Adversarial Success Rate (ASR) -Using the transpose CNN, we get more coherent text than with the other designs, and achieve an ASR of 67.28% against the SNLI classifier that boasts an accuracy of 89.42%. Table 2 shows some examples of adversarial hypotheses generated using the transpose CNN. The adversaries, although legible and informative, look quite similar to the premises despite the differences in their vector representations. This is due to conditioning the generation on the premises and how small the learned nuisances are. We also notice some changes in the meaning of the true hypotheses. The text adversaries generated by the remaining decoders are mostly illegible. We posit that this is due to the compounding effect of the perturbations on the language model or a distribution shift in the case of ARAE. In the future, we will investigate approaches like BERT [27] or GPT [28] .
Related Work
Szegedy et al. [10] first demonstrated that deep neural networks could achieve high accuracy on previously unseen examples while being vulnerable to tiny targeted nuisances. This finding has sparked keen interest in the research community to probe deep learning models [14, 1, 9, 11] in hope of understanding their weaknesses and to mitigate their vulnerabilities [4, 5, 6, 7] . Several studies have followed suit since then to improve the robustness of neural networks [4, 29] .
In general, studies in adversarial deep learning can be categorized into two groups. The first group proposes to generate adversaries directly in the input data space by distorting, occluding or changing illumination in input images [14, 30, 8] to cause changes in classification. It focuses at perturbing images with noise or patterns that do not necessarily look realistic but that can cause the images to be misclassified. The second group, where our work belongs, uses generative models [2, 3] to search for adversaries in the dense and continuous representation of the data rather than in its input space. This group favors generating more natural and realistic-looking adversarial examples.
Adversarial Images -Song et al. [2] propose to construct unrestricted adversarial examples by training a conditional generative model that constrains the search region for a z in the neighborhood of a target z. Zhao et al. [3] propose mapping input images to a latent space using GANs, and to search for adversarial examples in that space. Both [3] and [2] studies are closely related to ours. However, in our case, we do not need to set the noise level to inject to the true inputs or their latent representations as the perturbations are automatically learned during training. Furthermore, by capturing the uncertainty induced by the mapping of the data to latent space, we learn to characterize the structure of the data better, which allows us to generate more realistic-looking adversaries.
Adversarial Text -Previous studies on adversarial text generation [26, 31, 32, 33] perform word erasures and replacements directly on the input space, using domain-specific rules or heuristics, or require manual curation. Recently, [3] propose to search for textual adversaries in the latent representation of the data. Our approaches are similar. However, the search for adversaries is handled more gracefully in our case thanks to an efficient gradient-based optimization method in lieu of a computationally expensive search in the latent space.
Conclusion
Many adversarial learning approaches usually fail to enforce the semantic-relatedness that ought to exist between true inputs and their adversaries. Motivated by this fact, we provided an approach tailored explicitly to ensuring that the adversaries and their inputs exhibit the same high-level characteristics and semantic features.
In summary, we proposed to construct adversarial examples from learning the manifold of the inputs. We developed a method to find adversaries of image and text inputs from within an input's own manifold by automatically learning to perturb its latent code with efficiently sampled and imperceptible noise. The resulting adversaries appear realistic, informative, and similar to the inputs. 
